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Hancock's War: Conflict on the Southern Plains. 
By William Y. Chalfant. Foreword by Jerome 
A. Greene. Norman, OK: Arthur H. Clark 
Co., 2010. 540 pp. Maps, illustrations, notes, 
bibliography, index. $59.95. 
Major General Winfield Scott Hancock 
headed west from Fort Riley in late March of 
1867, well prepared to engage the Cheyennes in 
western Kansas. Seven companies of infantry, 
eight of cavalry, and an artillery battery accom-
panied him. A man with political ambitions, 
he also brought the press along to publicize 
his efforts. Hancock had neither knowledge 
nor curiosity about the culture of the people 
he sought. He wanted to fight them. "I think 
it would be to our advantage to have these 
Indians refuse the demands I intend to make, 
a war with the Cheyennes would answer our 
purpose." 
Traveling the Santa Fe Trail and picking 
up supplies at forts along the way, Hancock's 
forces turned west from Fort Larned, heading 
up Pawnee Creek. On April 13, at a point about 
fifty miles north of Fort Dodge, the expedition 
was confronted by several hundred Cheyenne 
and Oglala warriors. Speaking through the 
agent and interpreter Edward Wynkoop, the 
Indians indicated they would be willing to 
talk, but begged Hancock to keep the soldiers 
away from their village as their people were 
fearful of an attack like the one Chivington 
had perpetrated at Sand Creek in November 
of 1864. Hancock ignored their concerns and 
proceeded to the village, which consisted of 
some three hundred lodges. 
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Hancock was furious upon arriving to find 
that the women and children had fled. Such 
action was "treachery"-they had fled out of 
a sense of guilt over their many transgres-
sions, and their action was, indeed, a signal of 
the "commencement of war." While George 
Armstrong Custer and the Seventh Cavalry 
pursued the Indians, Hancock put the village 
to the torch, justifying the retaliation that 
would follow. 
The fleeing Indians had a thorough knowl-
edge of the region and easily escaped Custer, 
who was encumbered by his supply train. After 
a few days of frustration, Custer led his men 
east along the Smokey Hill River to Fort Hays 
where a shortage of supplies kept him out of the 
field until June. Hancock's contribution was 
over at this point, and he returned east. 
In June, Custer headed northwest to resup-
ply at Fort Atkinson and scour the forks of the 
Republican River for Indians to fight, finding 
them only when they wanted to be found. 
Custer was unpopular with his men and the 
unit suffered high rates of desertion, thirty-
five men deserting on July 7. When thirteen 
men walked away in broad daylight, Custer 
ordered that they be pursued and shot. Three 
were, one fatally. Strangely, however, his main 
concern was not desertion or fighting Indians, 
but arranging for his wife Libbie to join him 
in the field. Unable to achieve this, he wound 
up his expedition at Fort Wallace and imme-
diately headed east with seventy-six men, two 
ambulances, and no permission. When Indians 
killed one straggler and injured another, he left 
others to clean up the mess, abandoning his 
troops at Downer Station and continuing east 
with the ambulances to his adoring wife. This 
action, as well as the shooting of the deserters 
without due process, would result in court-
martial and suspension of rank and command 
for one year. 
Hancock pursued his political ambitions, 
which climaxed with an unsuccessful run for 
the presidency. He lost to James Garfield in 
1880. His expedition of 1867 accomplished 
nothing. The senseless destruction of the vil-
lage instigated another summer of violence on 
the Great Plains as the Indians continued to 
resist the relentless advance of roads, rail lines, 
and settlements. The continuing violence 
inspired the establishment of a peace com-
mission. In October of 1867, the commission 
traveled to Medicine Lodge Creek in south-
central Kansas where a grand council was held 
and a shameful swindle perpetrated. Indians, 
who were misled about the treaty's provisions 
and lacked the authority to act for their people 
anyway, were goaded into making marks on 
the paper and consigning their people to the 
reservation. 
The late William Chalfant's excellent book 
is a tightly written, day-by-day account of 
both Hancock's and Custer's expeditions. His 
descriptions of the Native people and the tragic 
situation in which they found themselves are 
compelling. Although I would have preferred 
more than the three maps that support the 
text, this book stands as a fine piece of schol-
arship, illuminating an important chapter of 
Great Plains history. 
STEVEN C. HAACK 
Independent Scholar 
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